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who are likely to top up unemployment benefits with earnings from marginal employ-
ment. We find that marginal employment (i) does not affect time spent in regular
employment within a three-year observation period, (ii) reduces future unemployment,
where (iii) the effects on unemployment are to be seen as transitory. Furthermore, it
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* This paper was released for publication in May 2008.
** We thank one of the editors of this special issue and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
Moreover, we are grateful for comments on an earlier version of this paper by Florian Zinsmeister, Johannes
Ziemendorff, Marco Caliendo, Andrea Weber, Kai-Uwe Mueller and seminar participants at the Stockholm
School of Economics, the IAB Nuremberg, the Free University Berlin and the LoWER Workshop in Berlin.
We would also like to thank the German Science Foundation (DFG) for funding under the project ‘Work





3 Data and evaluation design
4 Empirical methodology
5 Results






ZAF 2 und 3/2008, S. 223Ð243 223Marginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
1 Introduction
‘Marginal employment’ (‘Geringfügige Beschäfti-
gung’), i.e. employment with low working hours and
earnings not or only partially subject to social secu-
rity contributions, has been gaining importance in
the German economy over the past decade. There
are two opposing views on this development among
economists and policy makers. On the one hand, the
existence of marginal employment (ME) has been
seen as a means to improve labour market flexibil-
ity, to shore up financial incentives to take up low-
paid work and to reduce labour costs for firms,
thereby increasing the demand for low-productivity
workers. This view seems to underlie recent devel-
opment in ‘active’ labour market policy in Germany
and elsewhere (see e.g. Fertig and Kluve 2006;
Steiner 2006). On the other hand, critics are
sceptical about the potential of marginal employ-
ment to enhance job creation and stress the danger
of regular full-time jobs being substituted by subsi-
dized ME (see e.g. Schöb and Weimann 2004: 115Ð
122; Bofinger et al. 2006).
Studying the labour market impact of ME may
therefore shed light on the issue of labour market
flexibility and is also of substantial policy interest.
For various reasons, the German case is particularly
interesting: firstly, while social security contributions
weigh relatively heavily on low-productivity jobs,
ME is partly exempted from this burden in Ger-
many. Secondly, ME has grown substantially in Ger-
many over the last couple of years, while overall em-
ployment has stagnated in this period. Thirdly, mar-
ginal employment has gained considerable impor-
tance in German labour market policy. While a
reform in 1999 tried to curb the expansion of ME,
the so-called ‘Mini jobs’ reform in 2003 was imple-
mented with the aim of increasing work incentives
in the low-wage sector of the economy (see e.g.
Steiner and Wrohlich 2005). Recently, the employ-
ers’ contribution rate on these jobs has been in-
creased from 25% to 30.1% to again curb the al-
leged substitution of full-time jobs by publicly sub-
sidised ME.
Despite its increasing quantitative importance and
policy relevance, there has been relatively little em-
pirical research on the labour market effects of ME
for Germany. There are some studies describing the
recent evolution and structure of ME in the German
labour market (see e.g. Schupp and Birkner 2004;
Fertig and Kluve 2006). Also, the labour supply ef-
fects of the mentioned ‘Mini jobs’ reform have been
analysed on the basis of ex-ante simulation studies
(Arntz et al. 2003; Steiner and Wrohlich 2005) as
well as ex-post evaluations (Caliendo and Wrohlich
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2006). These studies found that the reform has only
very small labour supply effects, especially among
the target group of long-term unemployed people.
However, to the best of our knowledge there has
hitherto been no empirical investigation on whether
ME acts as a ‘stepping stone’ to regular employment
or instead leads to ‘dead end’ jobs. In a recent study
for Austria, Böheim and Weber (2006) find that un-
employed people who take up ME end up with less
regular employment, more unemployment and lower
wages after three years than the control group of un-
employed who do not enter ME. These results seem
to support the ‘dead end’ view and the critics of pub-
licly subsidised ME.1
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the em-
ployment and earnings effects of ME for Germany.
The empirical analysis is based on a statistical
matching approach making use of register data from
the Employment Statistics of the Federal Employ-
ment Agency. We restrict the analysis to men be-
cause including women would make it necessary to
analyse the interrelations between ME and (conven-
tional) part-time employment. As shown by Freier
and Steiner (2007), these two employment types are
substitutes in production, especially for women
whose part-time share amounts to more than a third
of total employment in Germany. Furthermore, the
labour supply of married women would make it nec-
essary to account for household characteristics, such
as number and age of children, earnings of the
spouse, and other household income, on which we
do not have information in our data. The analysis
distinguishes between eastern and western Germany
because of prevailing pronounced differences in un-
employment between the two regions. We would ex-
pect ME to be more effective as a stepping stone
into regular employment in labour markets with
lower unemployment as it is the case, on average,
in western Germany. Furthermore, we also present
results for older men, because, for institutional
reasons, we expect that the effects of ME on future
employment and earnings may differ by age and be-
cause older unemployed people have recently be-
come a special target group for labour market policy
(see Haan and Steiner 2006).
In the next section, we provide some institutional
background on ME in Germany. Our data and eval-
uation methodology are described in sections 3 and
4. The evaluation results, summarised in section 5
show that although ME does not increase time spent
1 Whereas the ‘stepping stone’ hypothesis in relation to tempo-
rary jobs has been analysed frequently in the literature (for a
recent survey, see Ichino et al. 2006), there are apparently no
studies focusing on ME for other countries.Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner Marginal Employment
in regular employment within a three-year observa-
tion period it reduces future unemployment and, on
average, slightly increases cumulated future earn-
ings. We also identify important age differences in
these effects. Section 6 summarises the main results
of the study and concludes.
2 Institutional background
Since the mid 1990s, ME has been increasing sub-
stantially in Germany. Depending on how ME is
measured, estimates for recent years vary between
3 and 6 million people in ME, with a significant
increase over time (see e.g. Schupp et al. 1998; Ru-
dolph 1998; Schupp and Birkner 2004; Ziemendorff
2006). In particular, there is the important distinc-
tion between ME held as the only job or as a sec-
ondary job. On the basis of data from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), Schupp and Birkner
(2004, Table 4) estimate the total number of jobs in
ME (‘Mini jobs’) at about 5 million in 2003, of which
3.6 million were held as the only job, with an
increase of about half a million since 2000, according
to their estimates. Also using SOEP data, Rudolph
(1998) documents a substantial increase in ME since
the beginning of the 1990s.
This development was accompanied by several pol-
icy reforms aimed at either restricting or strengthen-
ing financial incentives for ME. Before 1999, jobs
with an upper earnings threshold of 325 Euros per
month and a maximum of 15 weekly working hours
were exempted from social security contributions
(SSC) on the part of the employee. The employer
had to pay a 20 percent tax on gross wages. ME in
a secondary job was treated equally with respect to
SSC. Earnings from several ME jobs held by a single
person were added up and the resulting sum was
subject to SSC.
The political aim of the 1999 reform was to restrict
the expansion of ME. Since then, the employer has
had to pay 22% SSC. Thus, little changed under this
reform for the employers of individuals working in
ME. The reform did not improve financial incen-
tives for those workers to expand hours of work and
take up regular employment either. Since SSC, and
possibly also income taxes, had to be paid in full
above the relatively low SSC threshold, the marginal
tax rate on such jobs remained rather high. On the
other hand, ME could be financially attractive for
recipients of unemployment benefit up to an earn-
ings threshold of 165 Euros, beyond which the de-
duction rate became 100%.
In contrast to the previous reform, the ‘Mini jobs
Reform’ of 2003 was intended to improve incentives
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to take up ME. The restriction on maximum hours
was abolished and the upper threshold of exempted
earnings was raised to 400 Euros per month. More-
over, earnings between 401 and 800 Euros are now
subject to a modified SSC scheme. Although this re-
form improved financial incentives for ‘secondary
workers’ (housewives, students, pensioners) to take
up low-paid jobs, it hardly changed incentives for
persons receiving unemployment or social assistance
benefits because of the high deduction rates (for de-
tails see e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich 2005; Steiner
2006). Motivated by the strong expansion of ME
following the 2003 reform, the employers’ SSC rate
was increased from 25% of gross monthly earnings
of 400 Euros to 30.1% in July 2006. For part-time
jobs with earnings between 401 and 800 Euros, em-
ployers still pay the normal employers’ SSC rate of
currently about 20%.
3 Data and evaluation design
Given the focus of our paper, the following analysis
is restricted to ME held as the only job and refers
to men entering registered unemployment after the
introduction of the 1999 reform and before the 2003
reform became effective. Thus, our sample excludes
all employed persons with ME held as a secondary
job as well as people out-of-the-labour force, such
as pensioners and students. For the reasons men-
tioned in the Introduction, we restrict the analysis
to men.
The data for our empirical analysis are derived from
the Employment Panel of the Federal Employment
Agency (EP-FEA), see Meinken and Koch (2005).
The EP-FEA contains detailed quarterly informa-
tion on employment and wages for a 2% random
sub-sample of all employees subject to social secu-
rity for the period 1998Ð2005, amounting to about
600,000 observations per quarter. Due to the fact
that ME had to be notified to the social security
system from 1999, the data include information on
ME starting with the second quarter of that year.
Spell information refers to a person’s main labour
force status. The evolution of marginal employment
in eastern and western Germany within the observa-
tion period as derived from our EP-FEA data is
shown in Figure 1.
The main strength of the EP-FEA data set is its
large size and the correspondence of what is coded
as ME in the data to the legal definition. We can,
therefore, explicitly distinguish ME from other
forms of employment, most importantly from con-Marginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
ventional part-time employment.2 Another main ad-
vantage is the high quality of employment-spell
(measured in days) and wage information in the EP-
FEA due to the fact that this information is used
for the calculation of individual entitlements to state
pensions.
There are also a few shortcomings of the EP-FEA
data: drawing on employment register data, unem-
2 For data after the second quarter of 2003, the FEA also provi-
des supplements to the main data which contain information on
ME as a secondary job.
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ployment was initially not registered in the EP-FEA
data. In 2000, the FEA started to supplement the
data with information from the unemployment sta-
tistics. However, unemployment remains incom-
pletely coded in the data, as neither unemployment
not registered at the labour agency3 nor unemploy-
ment during a spell of ME is coded. Moreover, there
is no information on the amount of unemployment
benefit received by a person in the data. Another
disadvantage of the EP-FEA data is that the data
do not contain information on household variables
such as the employment status of the spouse, the
presence of children and other household income.
Since we restrict the analysis to men whose employ-
ment behaviour is not expected to depend signifi-
cantly on these variables, this is of little concern
here.
In order to evaluate the effects of ME on subse-
quent individual labour market outcomes, we have
organized the EP-FEA data as illustrated in Figure 2.
The analysis is based on a sample of four quarterly
inflow cohorts of men who became unemployed for
at least 3 months during the period from April 1,
2001 to March 31, 2002 and who were either in regu-
lar employment or in ME before. We distinguish be-
tween quarterly inflow cohorts to account for poten-
tial seasonal and business-cycle effects on individual
labour market outcomes.4 There are two reasons for
including only those who have been unemployed for
at least 3 months in the analysis: first, shorter spells
3 Note that in Germany a person is registered as unemployed
without beeing entitled to unemployment benefits if he proves
to the employment agency that she is actively looking for a job.
4 The German business cycle turned from a modest downturn
into a mild recession during the inflow period.Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner Marginal Employment
of unemployment are not identified in our data. Se-
cond, even if they were, we would prefer to restrict
the analysis to longer unemployment spells because
the analysis appears more relevant for longer-term
unemployment than for purely frictional unemploy-
ment.
For each person included in the sample, we define a
‘risk period’ of 9 months and determine whether the
individual took up ME within this period as the first
occupational status after leaving unemployment.
Following terminology in the evaluation literature,
we denote these persons as belonging to the ’treat-
ment group’.5 Individuals who remained unem-
ployed or found positions in regular employment
within the risk period comprise the potential control
group. Note that, contrary to what seems to be usual
the practice in the evaluation literature, we neither
exclude individuals from the control group alto-
gether nor treat them as right-censored at the time
when they change treatment status. The reason for
this is that we want to assess the future labour mar-
ket performance of men who take up ME within a
specific time period Ð the risk period defined
above Ð compared to a control group of people who
had the same ex-ante chance of taking up ME within
this risk period. However, to appraise the sensitivity
of our results to this specification, we also estimate
treatment effects leaving out all of the individuals
from the control group who changed treatment
status during the outcome period.
5 As suggested by one referee, the term ‘treatment’ as usually
used in the evaluation literature refers to a (training) programme
which is formally initiated by a third party (the employment
agency). Although we agree that the degree to which unemployed
people and/or the employment agency decide on programme par-
ticipation in a specific programme may differ, the decision to par-
ticipate is ultimately voluntaryÐno one can be forced to partici-
pate in a programme, of course, although there might be conse-
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Table 1 shows that there is a total of 33,005 observa-
tions of which 1,275 (908) are treated and 20,763
(10,059) belong to the potential control group in
western (eastern) Germany. The number of observa-
tions is not distributed evenly across the four co-
horts, which may reflect both seasonal and cyclical
effects. In each of the four cohorts, the share of un-
employed men taking up ME in eastern Germany is
much larger than that in the west, with an average
share across cohorts of about 9% and 6% respec-
tively. This may be related to the much higher unem-
ployment rate and poor prospects regarding regular
employment in eastern Germany, also reflected by
the high share of the total unemployment inflow in
eastern Germany relative to Germany as a whole.6
The lower part of Table 1 shows the distribution of
observations for men older than 50 and for those
with monthly earnings of less than 166 Euros. Below,
we present separate estimation results for older men
to check whether ME may act as a stepping stone
into regular employment also for older people
whose share of long-term unemployment is dispro-
portionally high in both eastern and western Ger-
many. We also estimate separate treatment effects
for ME with monthly earnings of less than 166
Euros to check whether they differ from those ob-
quences for refusal to participate, such as loss of unemployment
benefits. Benefit sanctions can also be imposed by the employ-
ment agency, however, if the unemployed does not actively search
for a job (see e.g. Müller 2007), which could perhaps be avoided
by taking up marginal employment. Thus, the perceived diffe-
rence between traditional active labor market programmes, such
as training courses or public works programmes, may be more
semantic than substantial regarding the participation decision. In
any case, given that the Conditional Independence Assumption
discussed in Section 4 holds, this distinction is of no relevance.
6 The eastern German share of 1/3 of the total unemployment
inflow is almost double its population share.Marginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
tained for the treatment group as a whole. As men-
tioned in Section 2, in the observation period the
maximum amount that a recipient of unemployment
benefit could earn was 165 Euros per month (earn-
ings above this threshold were deducted at a rate
of 100%). One might therefore expect that people
earning less than this threshold are just topping up
unemployment benefits and ME in this case should
be evaluated differently than in cases where ME is
associated with earnings above this threshold. In
fact, Table 1 shows a large share of ME below this
threshold: about 45% in western Germany and
more than 70% in eastern Germany. Since there is
no direct information in our data about whether an
individual still receives unemployment benefit while
in ME, we can only distinguish indirectly between
ME undertaken as a means of topping up unem-
ployment benefit and ‘pure’ ME by using informa-
tion on the corresponding amount of earnings.
Our choice of the inflow sample is motivated by the
requirement for sufficiently long observation pe-
riods before and after the risk period. The choice of
the risk period, in turn, takes into account that dur-
ing the first few months of unemployment people
tend to search for regular employment or do not
search for a job at all, and may only later lower their
aspiration levels and take up ME. Furthermore, the
pressure from the employment office to take up ME
might also increase with the duration of unemploy-
ment. By choosing a 9-month risk period we take
these effects into account and, at the same time,
leave a sufficiently long time period for evaluating
the longer-term effects of taking up ME.
To evaluate the labour market effects of ME, we
define several outcome variables over a period of a
minimum of 3 years (subsequently denoted as ‘out-
come period’) after the risk period ends (Stage 3,
see Figure 2). For each cohort, the end of the risk
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period is set before the beginning of 2003 to avoid
interference from the ‘Mini job’ reform imple-
mented in April 2003 (see Section 2) and anticipa-
tory effects in the first quarter of that year. The cho-
sen length of the outcome period allows us to study
longer-term (dynamic) effects of participating in ME
on labour market outcomes. The outcome variables
of interest are: (i) time spent in regular full-time em-
ployment, (ii) in ME, (iii) in registered unemploy-
ment, and (iv) wages.
Table 2 shows that, both in western and eastern Ger-
many, previously unemployed men who took up ME
within the risk period (treatment group) spent less
time in regular employment during the outcome
period than those who did not take up ME within
the risk period (unmatched control group), but also
spent much less time in unemployment. On average,
the treatment group was in ME for 116 (95) days in
western (eastern) Germany. In accordance with our
definition given above, we also measure the time
spent in ME for the control group. Compared to ME
overall, the average number of days in ME with
monthly earnings below 166 Euros is much lower
for the treatment group both in western and eastern
Germany. This may suggest that the use of ME to top
up unemployment benefit is used as a temporary
rather than a permanent option. Almost by defini-
tion, the average monthly wage in employment is
much lower in the treatment group than in the un-
matched control group, although this difference is
less pronounced in eastern Germany. Monthly earn-
ings coded in the EP-FEA data are derived from in-
formation on daily earnings and employment days.7
Of course, these differences in the outcome vari-
ables between the potential (unmatched) control
7 If a worker was employed for less than 30 days within a month,
his wage is adjusted to correspond to a full employment month.Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner Marginal Employment
and the treatment group do not represent the effect
of taking up ME on future labour market outcomes
because the two groups are likely to differ in various
characteristics affecting both selection into ME and
the respective outcome variable. In the next section,
we present our approach to account for potential
selection effects in the estimation of treatment ef-
fects.
4 Empirical methodology
We want to estimate the average effect of taking up
ME in the group of previously unemployed people
who actually took up ME instead of remaining un-
employed and continued searching for a regular job.
This effect, which is the focus of much of the recent
evaluation literature (see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde
and Smith 1999), is termed the ‘average treatment
effect on the treated’, ATT. It is defined as
ATT (X)=E(Y1 Ð Y0|D =1 , X), where Y1 is the
potential outcome if the individual with observable
characteristics X takes up ME (D =1 ) ,Y0 is the
potential outcome if the individual does not self-se-
lect into ME (D = 0), and E is the mathematical
expectation operator. By simple averaging, the ATT
for a sub-sample or the whole sample of participants
can be derived, e.g. for the latter ATT =
EX[E(Y1 Ð Y0|D =1 ,X)] = EX[(E(Y|D =l ,X) Ð
E(Y|D =0 ,X))|D =1] .
The evaluation literature offers various ways to esti-
mate the ATT. The traditional control function ap-
proach (see e.g. Heckman and Robb 1985; Heck-
man, LaLonde and Smith 1999: 1956Ð1961) speci-
fies an outcome and a selection equation in terms of
a latent and an observed indicator variable which
both depend on observed and unobserved charac-
teristics. This approach can also be adapted to take
into account the dynamic nature of treatment as-
signment and outcomes by way of duration models.
A possible drawback of the control function ap-
proach is that it relies heavily on functional form
assumptions and usually also on some exclusion re-
strictions for identification.8 Ignoring ‘selection on
8 For applications to the evaluation of training programmes in
Germany see e.g. Hujer et al. (1997) and Kraus et al. (1999). In
the more recent ‘timing-of-events’ approach developed by Ab-
bring and Van den Berg (2003) the ATT is identified from the
sequence of assignment to a programme and the event defining
the outcome variable (e.g. unemployment-to-employment transi-
tion) without exclusion restrictions on the set of observables in-
cluded in the equation describing the outcome variable. Since our
sample design allows for multiple ME spells, change in treatment
status as well as several outcome variables (including wages), the
joint estimation of a fully specified (multiple-state, multiple spell)
hazard rate model and wage equation does not seem feasible and
is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, even if
it could be done, we doubt that it would add substantial insights
to answering our research question specified above.
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unobservables’, the ATT can also be estimated using
an extended matching estimator that can account for
the dynamic nature of treatment assignment and
outcomes (see e.g. Gerfin and Lechner 2002; Sianesi
2004; Fitzenberger et al. 2006).9
Here we follow these latter authors and apply pro-
pensity-score matching to estimate the ATT of ta-
king up ME for the outcome variables defined in
the previous section. Statistical matching is based on
variants of the Conditional Independence Assump-
tion (CIA) which states that, conditional on X, the
potential outcomes are independent of participation
in the programme. Since we are estimating the ATT,
we only need to assume that Y0 is independent of
D, because the moments of the distribution of Y1 for
the treatment group can be estimated directly. In
fact, for the purpose of estimating the ATT we can
even rely on the less restrictive assumption that the
conditional mean of the outcome variable is inde-
pendent of the treatment status, i.e. E(Y0|D =
0,X)=E(Y0|D =1 ,X)=E(Y0|X). In other words,
selection into ME only depends on observables X,
but does not depend on unobservable factors.
This is obviously a rather strong assumption whose
credibility might be questioned. However, for the
following reasons we believe that this assumption is
likely to hold for our application: firstly, we condi-
tion on both an individual’s employment status in
the quarter before entering unemployment and re-
strict the analysis to unemployed people who experi-
ence an unemployment spell lasting for at least 3
months. Whilst this restriction puts limits on the
generality of our analysis, it also reduces potential
differences in unobserved heterogeneity affecting
both treatment status and outcome variables, such
as the motivation to search for a job. Secondly, we
match both on labour market outcomes from 2 years
prior to the treatment as well as the duration of the
current unemployment spell. We believe that this
further reduces differences in unobserved hetero-
geneity affecting both treatment status and outcome
variables. And thirdly, we show that our matching
procedure is very successful in balancing the differ-
9 All these approaches evaluate programme effects on the respec-
tive outcome variable within the observed outcome period. As
suggested by one referee, one could also attempt to simulate the
effect of the programme on the equilibrium distribution of labour
market outcomes (states). This would, however, require the speci-
fication and estimation of a fully specified multiple state, multiple
spell hazard rate model and imply out-of-sample predictions. Al-
though this more general approach would make it possible to
answer additional policy-relevant questions and also to perform
ex-ante evaluations of potential policy reforms, it is not required
to analyse the research questions usually posed in the ex-post
programme evaluation literature.Marginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
ences in observable characteristics between the
treatment and control group.
In particular, we match on indicators of an individ-
ual’s previous labour market history as well as the
elapsed duration in the current unemployment spell
before entering ME. Conditioning on previous un-
employment should be a rather effective way to con-
trol for time-invariant unobserved individual effects,
as suggested by previous labour market research for
Germany (see e.g. Lechner 1999; Caliendo and Ko-
peinig 2008). Conditional on the validity of the CIA
assumption, the ATT can be estimated consistently
simply by taking the mean over the difference of
each participant (or a sub-group of participants de-
fined by the respective partitioning of X ) and some










where N1 (N0) is the number of participants (non-
participants) and (i, j) is a weight placed on the j-th
individual from the control group of non-partici-
pants in constructing the counterfactual for the i-th
individual of the treatment group. Matching estima-
tors differ in the choice of the weighting function
(see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd
1998). Here, we apply a two-step matching estima-
tor:10
In the first step, we match on all variables defined at
the time when the individual entered unemployment
using a combination of nearest neighbour and cali-
per matching. In particular, for each treated person
i we identify six individuals (with replacement) in
the control group for whom the estimated propen-
sity score is nearest to that of person i. Of those
individuals we only keep the ones whose propensity
score lies within a radius of 0.005, which guarantees
satisfactory matching quality, especially at the tails
of the distribution of propensity scores.11
In the second step, we match directly on the elapsed
duration in unemployment before ME is taken up
10 Alternative ways to match on variables varying over the out-
come period are presented in e.g. Lechner (1999) and Sianesi
(2004).
11 Instead of the fixed radius 0.005 we have alternatively used
estimated standard errors of propensity scores (0.0489 for the
western German, 0.0495 for the eastern German sample) to de-
fine the radius. Although these exceed our fixed radius by the
factor 10, this had very little effect on the point estimates and the
estimated standard errors due to the fact that for the majority of
the observations the six nearest neighbour condition is binding.
For example, the point estimate for the outcome variable unem-
ployment in western Germany (all treated persons) changed
from Ð89.72 to Ð89.86, and in eastern Germany from 80.55 to
80.47.
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within the risk period. It is, of course, crucial to
match on this variable to avoid comparing a treated
person who takes up ME after an elapsed unem-
ployment duration of, say, 9 months with a person
from the potential control group with only 3 months
of elapsed unemployment duration. Since it varies
with process time, this variable cannot be used in
the first step of the matching procedure. Given that
a minimum of 3 months of unemployment is re-
quired for inclusion in our sample and our definition
of the risk period, we define the following unem-
ployment duration categories: one quarter, two
quarters or three quarters of elapsed unemployment
duration. Then, for each person in the treatment
group with a given elapsed duration of unemploy-
ment at the time of taking up ME we select those
individuals from the pool of up to six potential con-
trols with a similar elapsed duration of unemploy-
ment. So, for example, a treated person with an
elapsed unemployment duration of, say, 2 quarters
is only matched to members of the potential control
group with at least 2 quarters of unemployment. If
no match is found among the group of up to six
potential candidates, we match the treated person
to controls from the nearest duration category. The
chosen number of six nearest neighbours guarantees
both a sufficient number of individuals to allow for
exact matches in the second step and a high match-
ing quality, as shown below.
For statistical matching to work, it is crucial to con-
dition on those variables expected to affect both an
individual’s treatment status and his labour market
outcomes. In German labour market studies, it is
generally considered to be especially important to
include indicators of an individual’s previous
(un)employment history in the set of matching vari-
ables (see e.g. Lechner 1999; Caliendo and Kopeinig
2008). Given the chosen inflow period, we observe
how much time (in days) an individual spent in regu-
lar employment, in ME or out-of-the-labour force
during a period of 2 full years before entering unem-
ployment (Stage 1, see Figure 2 in the previous sec-
tion). Since information on registered unemploy-
ment is added only after 1999 and we require that
an individual in the sample must have been in some
form of employment immediately before entering
the unemployment spell, we have one full year
(Stage 2) during which we can compute individual
durations in unemployment.
In addition to indicators of an individual’s previ-
ous employment history, we match on a large
number of other individual characteristics dated at
the time of entry into unemployment. These in-
clude an individual’s age, his previous wage, theRonny Freier and Viktor Steiner Marginal Employment
level of education,12 nationality, previous occupa-
tional status, size and industry classification of the
last firm, and the quarter of an individual’s entry
into unemployment. Table A1 in the Appendix con-
tains descriptive statistics on all matching variables
for, respectively, the treatment and the potential
control groups in the two regions. The table shows
large differences between the sample means of most
variables in the treatment and the potential control
group before matching on observable characteris-
tics. For example, the average wage in western Ger-
many earned by the treatment group before enter-
ing unemployment is about 430 Euros less than
among the potential controls, whereas the share of
time spent in ME by the former is 12.2% compared
to only 3.7% in the latter group.
5 Results
5.1 Propensity score matching
The estimation results for the probit models used to
calculatethepropensityscoresformatchingpotential
controls to treated individuals are contained in Table
A2intheAppendix.Wehaveestimatedtheseprobits
for the total eastern and western German samples
and also for the restricted samples including only
those observations in the treatment group with
monthlyearningsoflessthan166Euros.Thesameset
of matching variables is included in all models. To al-
low for age differences in selection into ME we in-
clude interaction terms of an age dummy (age 50+)
andsomeofthematchingvariables.Asexpected,age,
indicators of an individual’s previous (un)employ-
ment history and some of the interaction terms be-
tween age and some of these indicator variables have
significant and strong effects on selection into ME.
To test if our matching procedure balances the dis-
tribution of matching variables between the treat-
ment and the control group, we use the standardized
bias (SB) measure suggested by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985). For each matching variable the SB is
defined as the difference of the sample means in the
treated and matched control sub-samples as a per-
centage of the square root of the average of sample
variances in both groups, i.e.:
12 As the EP-FEA has a rather large share of observations with
missing information on educational attainment, we have used the
panel structure of the data to impute information on education
from earlier or later observations of the same person. Observati-
ons with missings in the education variable for which we could
not impute valid values in this way are given a ‘missing’ dummy
variable as the education category in the probit estimation of pro-
pensity scores below.
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SB = 100 ·
X1 - X0
0.5(V1(X)+V0(X))
In addition, we have also calculated conventional t-
tests for equality of the means in two independent
samples (assuming equal population variances) for
each matching variable. As shown in Table 3, only
in one case does the t-test exceed the critical value
of about 2 (at the 5% significance level, two-sided
test) after matching. This is of little concern, how-
ever, since the coefficient of the variable in question
(‘skilled’ in eastern Germany) is not statistically sig-
nificant in the probit equation (see Table A2 in the
Appendix). That the matching procedure is fairly
successful in balancing the two groups in terms of
observable characteristics is also suggested by the
before-after comparison of the SB measure, which
shows a substantial reduction for almost all match-
ing variables.
Following usual practice (see e.g. Caliendo and Ko-
peinig 2008), we estimate treatment effects only for
those individuals for whom we have identified con-
trols with similar propensity scores or, in the lan-
guage of the matching literature, for observations in
the two groups with ‘common support’ regarding the
propensity score. As indicated by the box-plots of
the distribution of the estimated propensity scores
in Figure A1, the overlap between the two groups is
quite good in general, with the exception of some
treated persons with very high scores. However,
only very few observations had to be dropped be-
cause no suitable matched controls could be found,
which had no effect on estimation results.Marginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
5.2 Employment effects
The estimated average employment effects of taking
up ME in the reference period are summarized in Ta-
ble 4, where we distinguish between three outcome
variables: regular employment, ME and unemploy-
ment.Theestimatedaveragetreatmenteffectsarere-
ported for our sample of all men living in eastern and
western Germany, respectively, as well as for those
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aged 50 or older and for those with monthly earnings
below the threshold of 166 Euros defined by the un-
employment benefit system. Employment effects are
measured as differences in days per year.13
13 We calculate standard errors of estimated average treatment
effects using the bootstrap method as described in e.g. Efron and
Tibshirani (1986) on the basis of 100 repetitions. In a recent pa-
per, Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that for nearest-neighbourRonny Freier and Viktor Steiner Marginal Employment
As the first line in Table 4 shows, time spent in regu-
lar employment within the observation period does
not differ significantly between the treatment and
the control group. This holds, on average, for the
whole treated population in both western and east-
ern Germany as well as for older people and for
those with monthly earnings below 166 Euros.
As for the other two outcome variables, the esti-
mated average treatment effects more or less com-
pensate each other: in western Germany time spent
in ME within the observation period is about 90
days per year longer, on average, and unemploy-
ment duration is shorter by the same number of
days in the treatment group. Given that the outcome
period lasts at least 3 years, this means a total reduc-
tion in unemployment duration of roughly 9 months.
Although time spent in ME and in unemployment
more or less compensate each other for the older
treatment group as well, the estimated effects are
almost twice as large as those obtained for the treat-
ment group as a whole: taking up ME reduces un-
employment duration in the outcome period for
older people by 156 (142) days per year in western
(eastern) Germany, with corresponding increases in
time spent in ME. For the whole outcome period,
this amounts to a reduction in the total duration of
unemployment of about 1.3 years.
Regarding ME with earnings of less than 166 Euros,
estimated treatment effects hardly deviate from the
average effects. Our results thus do not support the
popular view that ME is just a means to supplement
matching with replacement and one or possibly a few neighbours
bootstrapping does not yield valid standard errors for the estima-
ted ATT. We cannot rule out that these results may also apply to
our application, although we employ six nearest neighbours in the
first step of our matching procedure.
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unemployment benefits thereby prolonging unem-
ployment and reducing incentives to take up regular
employment. Since the estimation results of the full
and the restricted samples differ little, in the
following we only discuss the estimation results for
the whole sample.
Figure 3 shows the dynamic treatment effects for the
three (un)employment outcome variables measured
as absolute difference in days in each quarter of the
outcome period. Regarding regular employment,
the estimated treatment effects are virtually zero
throughout, and this holds for both western and
eastern Germany as well as for older people in both
regions. If anything, regular employment in the
treatment group seems to be increasing in time rela-
tive to the respective control group, but in each
quarter the difference is very small and not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero.
The estimated zero treatment effects reported in Ta-
ble 4 do not result from a dynamic pattern with, for
example, initially less time spent in regular employ-
ment by the treatment group relative to the control
group being later compensated for by relatively
more time spent in regular employment by the for-
mer group. Thus, referring to the question asked in
the title of our paper, ME does not seem to act as a
stepping stone to regular employment.
However, nor is ME a dead end, as the pattern of
the dynamic treatment effects for the ME and the
unemployment outcome variables in the middle
panel of Figure 3 shows: the average ME treatment
effect in western (eastern) Germany, i.e. the differ-
ence in time spent in ME by the treatment and the
control group, declines from about 35 (30) days per
quarter at the beginning of the outcome period to
10 (8) days after 12 quarters. For older people both
in western and eastern Germany, the decline ofMarginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
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treatment effects is similar in relative terms, al-
though their level is substantially higher, corre-
sponding to the larger absolute average treatment
effects documented in Table 4. Thus, there does not
seem to be a “lock-in” effect regarding ME, as has
been observed for other labour market programmes.
This is also confirmed by the dynamic pattern of the
treatment effects regarding regular employment in
Figure 3 Column 1.
For the unemployment outcome variable, Figure 3
shows roughly the opposite pattern of dynamic
treatment effects: the difference in unemployment
between the treatment and the control group de-
clines rapidly in the first few quarters of the out-
come period, then increases again (in absolute
terms), or at least does not further decline, for a
couple of quarters, and subsequently continues to
decline until it reaches only a few days at the end of
the outcome period. There is little difference here
between the estimated average treatment effects of
the two regions and also of the treatment group as
a whole and the sub-sample of older people. Since
the dynamic treatment effects plotted in Figure 3
measure differences in the outcome variables, they
are not informative about the question whether
these effects are driven by changes in a particular
outcome variable in the treatment group or in the
control group, or both. Furthermore, the number of
days spent in a particular labour market state in any
given quarter by both of the groups can be split up
into the share of people with at least one day spent
in each of these states and the average number of
days spent in each state. Figure A2 in the Appendix
plots the shares of people in both the treatment and
the control groups with zero days spent in a particu-
lar state in a given quarter.
For the treatment group as a whole, the share of
people with zero days in ME increases substantially
over time, whereas this share declines slightly but
steadily in the respective control group. This shows
that the pattern of the dynamic treatment effects for
the ME outcome variable depicted in Figure 3 is
mainly driven by the increasing share of people in
the treatment group who terminate ME, although
the slightly increasing share of people who took up
ME during the outcome period has also contributed
to the adjustment process.
The opposite dynamic pattern is observed for the
unemployment outcome variable: the share of peo-
ple with zero days of unemployment in the treat-
ment group remains more or less at its initial level,
whereas for the respective control group this share
strongly increases over time reaching a similar level
to the treatment group at the end of the observation
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period. This dynamic pattern strongly indicates that
the unemployment rates in the two groups converge
in the long run and that the effects of taking up ME
on unemployment are only transitory. Still, these
transitory effects are quite substantial cumulated
over the observed outcome period of three years.
As mentioned above, an increasing share of people
whom we included in our control group because
they did not take up ME in the pre-specified risk
period actually took up ME during the outcome
period. As a sensitivity check, we excluded people
from the control group who changed treatment
status during the outcome period, i.e. moved from
unemployment or regular employment into ME,
and re-estimated the treatment effects for the
(un)employment outcome variables. The estimation
results, summarized in the upper part of Table A3
in the Appendix, show that our conclusions derived
from Table 4 do not change qualitatively if we use
this modified control group. Although the treatment
effects estimated for the ME and unemployment
outcome variables increase in absolute terms, the
magnitude of these changes is rather small. For ex-
ample, for the unemployment outcome variable the
estimated average effect for the western German
treatment group as a whole increases from about Ð90
days (with an estimated s.e. of 4.8) to Ð107 days
(s.e. = 5.4), hardly a statistically significant change.
Of course, estimates of these ‘conditional’ treatment
effects, conditional on not taking up ME in the risk
period may induce selection bias. Furthermore, even
if these conditional treatment effects were unbiased,
their interpretation is difficult since they do not re-
fer to a clearly defined reference group. However,
since the exclusion of people who changed treat-
ment status from the control group leaves our esti-
mation results virtually unchanged, we find no evi-
dence indicating the presence of selection effects.
5.3 Earnings effects
The estimated earnings effects of taking up ME in
the reference period measured as differences be-
tween the monthly earnings of the treatment and
the control group are summarized in Table 5 for all
treated persons and for those aged 50 or older. The
control group is defined as in the main analysis of
employment effects above, i.e. including those who
took up ME after the risk period.
The first row of Table 5 shows that, conditional on
either ME or regular employment, the average
monthly gross earnings of the treatment group were
much lower than those of the control group duringMarginal Employment Ronny Freier and Viktor Steiner
the outcome period; the (negative) average treat-
ment effect amounts to about 470 (300) Euros in
western (eastern) Germany. In both regions, the
treatment effects on earnings are particularly strong
for older men, amounting to about 740 Euros per
month in western Germany and to 490 Euros in the
eastern. Since these effects are conditional on being
either in ME or in regular employment, the large
negative earnings differential virtually arises by defi-
nition of ME. What is more interesting is the esti-
mated treatment effect on earnings in regular em-
ployment. This effect amounts to about 166 (60)
Euros in western (eastern) Germany for the treat-
ment group as a whole, but is not statistically signifi-
cant for older people.14 Regional differences in esti-
mated treatment effects on earnings are probably
related to the still much lower level of wages in reg-
ular employment in the eastern German labour mar-
ket.
Since we know from the previous section that the
treatment group spends roughly the same time in
regular employment as the control group, but less
time in unemployment, one would expect earnings
cumulated over the outcome period to be higher for
the treatment group, on average. As the last row
of Table 5 shows, this conjecture is indeed true on
average, although the estimated cumulated earnings
effect differs substantially by region and age:
whereas it amounts to about 730 Euros per year in
eastern Germany, where it differs little by age, the
cumulative average earnings effect is less than 200
Euros in the western, and even slightly negative for
older people.15 Thus, this group’s lower unemploy-
14 We obtain qualitatively similar results when people who chan-
ged treatment status during the outcome period are excluded
from the control group; see the estimation results in the lower
part of Table (A3) in the Appendix.
15 We have used the estimated negative earnings differential in
regular employment for older people, although it is not statisti-
cally significant.
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ment in the outcome period does not fully compen-
sate for the negative earnings differential in either
form of employment help by the treatment group
during the outcome period, if this only amounts to
a fairly small negative cumulative earnings effect of
about 640 Euros per year.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated, for the German
economy, whether marginal employment (ME) acts
as a stepping stone into regular employment for un-
employed men or instead leads to dead-end jobs
with little pay and a large degree of job insecurity,
as critics claim. Using newly available register data
from the Federal Employment Agency covering the
period 1998-2005 and statistical matching tech-
niques, we have analysed differences in various la-
bour market outcome variables between a treatment
group of previously unemployed men who took up
ME at the beginning of their unemployment spell
and a control group of people who did not.
Our empirical results show that although ME does
not significantly increase the treatment group’s
chance of gaining regular employment during an
outcome period of at least three years, it reduces
future unemployment and, on average, slightly in-
creases the cumulated future earnings of the treat-
ment group relative to the control group. The treat-
ment effect on future unemployment is substantial
in both western and eastern Germany: during the
three-year outcome period the total duration of un-
employment experienced by the treatment group is
reduced by about 9 months on average, relative to
the control group. For older people, unemployment
treatment effects are almost twice as large as those
obtained for the treatment group as a whole,
amounting to a reduction in the total duration of
unemployment of about 1.3 years during the wholeRonny Freier and Viktor Steiner Marginal Employment
outcome period. Still, the cumulative treatment ef-
fect on earnings for older men is slightly negative
in western Germany and only modestly positive in
eastern Germany. From a policy perspective, our
evaluation results suggest that exemption from so-
cial security contributions may be effective in reduc-
ing unemployment, especially regarding older men,
who have been an important target group of recent
‘active’ labour market policy in Germany, see e.g.
Haan and Steiner (2008). However, the dynamic
pattern of the estimated treatment effects indicates
that the impact of taking up ME on unemployment
is to a large extent only transitory. Thus, ME might
not be an effective labour market policy, especially
for younger workers.
These results seem robust with respect to our defini-
tion of the control group and to the inclusion of ME
with earnings below the maximum threshold for re-
ceiving unemployment benefits. Excluding people
from the control group who changed treatment
status during the outcome period, i.e. moved from
unemployment or regular employment into ME, did
not significantly change the estimated treatment ef-
fects for the (un)employment outcome variables. We
also found no evidence for the hypothesis that ME is
just a means to supplement unemployment benefits
thereby prolonging unemployment and reducing in-
centives to take up regular employment. However,
given the limitations of the statistical matching ap-
proach, we cannot rule out substitution effects be-
tween ME, which is exempted from social security
contributions, and regular employment. In fact, re-
cent empirical evidence for Germany suggests that
ME and regular employment are substitutes in pro-
duction, even if the size of the substitution elasticity
is not very large for men in Germany (see Freier
and Steiner 2007). Given this result and the fairly
small share of men working part-time, substitution
effects seem negligible for them. However, they
might still be of substantial size for women. Thus,
analysing the labour market effects of marginal em-
ployment for women would require a more general
empirical methodology which also would have to
take into account the potential substitution effects
between part-time and marginal employment.
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